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Impact of Criminal Justice Debt on  
Indigent Defendants in Tennessee 
 
Elizabeth Forester*
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Shelby County Office of the Public Defender has a stack of intake 
forms from clients and other indigent former offenders who wish to have 
their administrative fees1 waived by a judge. As a result of years of 
accumulated court costs and fees, people are unable to reacquire their 
driver’s licenses2 even after they complete their court-ordered sanctions 
unless they petition to have their records expunged or pay the costs and 
fees.3 Tennessee permits judges to waive court costs and fees.4 Because 
there are so few resources available to help petitioners, the process is slow, 
with the Public Defender’s staff working to prepare motions in their spare 
time. The result is that people still face statutory and procedural hurdles to 
re-entry—even in a court system that is generally amenable to relieving 
court costs and fees for those unable to pay.5  
Because of these statutory barriers, many ex-offenders are unable to fully 
reintegrate into society and obtain employment to support their families. 
The penological objectives for an offender-funded justice system are left 
unmet when defendants return home and are unable to get jobs, thus 
 
 
*. J.D. (2019), Washington University School of Law. I thank the editorial staff of the 
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, particularly Noah Watson and Elliot Rosenwald, the 
staff of the Shelby County Office of the Public Defender, and Josh Spickler of Just City.  
1. In this Note, the terms administrative fees, court costs, criminal-justice debt, and legal 
financial obligations (LFOs) are all used interchangeably. The specific varieties of fees are explored in 
Part II. Fines are not typically included in this category as they are assigned as part of a punitive sanction 
rather than to offset the administrative cost of a criminal procedure.  
2. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-105(b) (2019).  
3. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(g)(2)(C)(i) (2019). 
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-25-123(b) (2017). Sometimes, indigent criminal defendants may 
participate in community service in lieu of paying court costs. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-25-123(c)(2) 
(2017). 
5. See infra notes 106 to 113 and accompanying text. 
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becoming more likely to commit crimes out of desperation.6 Scholars have 
raised both constitutional and policy arguments against certain types of legal 
financial obligations (“LFOs”) and the ways in which they are assessed, 
particularly those that are incurred before any determination of guilt has 
been made.7 
While Tennessee—and Shelby County in particular—follows the letter 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bearden v. Georgia and does not 
regularly incarcerate people for unpaid debt,8 the reality is that many ex-
offenders are saddled with hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars in debt 
upon re-entry. With this in mind, this Note commends the repeal of 
Tennessee’s driver’s license revocation statute, implementing a state-wide 
system to track the revenue actually generated by LFOs, and providing more 
resources dedicated to public defender offices specifically to aid people 
petitioning for their costs to be waived.  
Part I examines the history of criminal justice debt in the United States, 
beginning with legal history in the Supreme Court and the State of 
Tennessee. Then, the current state of LFOs in Tennessee is examined, drawn 
from statutes, case law, and the state and Shelby County budgets. Finally, 
various constitutional and policy arguments about criminal justice debt are 
discussed. Part II analyzes whether the constitutional and policy arguments 
are valid in the context of Tennessee law and practice. Part III offers 
Tennessee-specific remedies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as 
Misguided Policy, 10 AM. SOC’Y OF CRIMINOLOGY (SPECIAL ISSUE) 509, 519–20 (2011).  
7. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in 
the Criminal Justice System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1516 (2016); Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, 
Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 
848 (2013); Beckett & Harris, supra note 6, at 509–10.  
8. 461 U.S. 660 (1983). It should be noted that the situation is direr in many other areas of the 
country as people are regularly incarcerated for failure to pay their LFOs, despite the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bearden v. Georgia barring incarceration for failure to pay unless the failure is found to be 
willful after a court hearing. See id. at 672. These states argue that Bearden hearings are properly given, 
but evidence shows that such hearings are perfunctory at best. See infra note 22. However, this Note is 
primarily focused on Tennessee, so it will only cover modern debtors’ prisons in the context of the 
general history of LFOs in the United States.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/17
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I. HISTORY 
 
A. History of Indigent Defendants’ Debt 
The Supreme Court has long been concerned with the plight of indigent 
defendants in the criminal justice system. Though Gideon v. Wainwright9 is 
perhaps the most well-known indigent defense case, the Supreme Court 
addressed indigent defendants’ procedural due process rights seven years 
earlier in Griffin v. Illinois.10 Soon after that, the Court followed Griffin’s 
precedent in Burns v. Ohio, a factually similar case.11 
Eventually, the Court specifically addressed state imprisonment for 
criminal debt. In Williams v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held “[a] statute 
permitting a sentence of both imprisonment and fine cannot be parlayed into 
a longer term of imprisonment than is fixed by the statute since to do so 
would be to accomplish indirectly as to an indigent that which cannot be 
done directly.”12 Williams is the first case in this area of law,13 though the 
holding was ultimately narrow.14 The Williams holding paved the way for 
cases such as Tate v. Short15 and Bearden v. Georgia.16 While Tate had 
 
 
9. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that felony defendants in state criminal court cases are 
entitled to appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel).   
10. 351 U.S. 12, 19–20 (1956) (holding that preventing a petitioner from filing an appeal because 
he could not afford the transcript fee violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses because denying the petitioner the right to appeal was essentially the equivalent of 
denying him the right to a trial).   
11. 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959) (holding that requiring an indigent defendant to pay a filing fee in 
order to permit him or her to file a motion for appeal before the Ohio Supreme Court violates the 
defendant’s right to due process and equal protection under the law). 
12. 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).  
13. See Appleman, supra note 7, at 1490; Torie Anderson, Note, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal 
Fines Become Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
189, 211 (2016); Note, State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1024, 1032 (2016).  
14. While Williams is used as a jumping-off point for this area of law, the holding is primarily 
concerned with imprisonment for failure to pay exceeding the length of the sentence mandated by statute. 
See Williams, 399 U.S. at 236. Rather than address constitutional concerns about imprisonment for 
failure to pay, the Court concentrates on the narrower issue of whether the State exceeded the sentencing 
bounds it set for itself. Id. 
15. 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971) (holding that it is a violation of an indigent defendant’s right to 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to only fine people who can afford to pay and convert 
the fine to imprisonment for those who cannot).  
16. 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
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analogous facts to Williams, the sentencing scheme in Williams only 
included fines rather than fines and imprisonment;17 thus, Tate is often read 
as an example of a Williams holding.18 Bearden, in contrast to Tate, 
broadened indigent defendants’ rights. The Court held that a state cannot 
revoke probation for failure to pay a fine, absent evidence that the 
probationer was willfully refusing to pay and alternative forms of 
punishment were inadequate.19 Similar to Williams, the Bearden holding 
was relatively narrow and has been interpreted different ways by courts and 
scholars, from essentially barring debtors’ prisons20 to requiring a Bearden 
hearing.21 Researchers note that there is little guidance on how to conduct 
indigency hearings under Bearden, resulting in many states conducting 
perfunctory or arbitrary ones. In one jurisdiction, a probation office—not 
the judge—is permitted to make the ability-to-pay determination, using such 
factors as whether “the probationer smoked cigarettes, owned multiple cell 
phones, or possessed a pair of popular sneakers.”22 In Michigan, courts must 
make an ability-to-pay assessment based on a “manifest hardship” standard, 
but only when “the fee is enforced and the defendant challenges that 
enforcement based upon his or her ability to pay,” meaning that many 
assessments are never actually made.23 
 
 
17. Williams, 399 U.S. at 236. 
18. Christopher D. Hampson, The New American Debtors’ Prisons, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 34 
(2016).  
19. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 662. The Court also explained, “A defendant’s poverty in no way 
immunizes him from punishment. Thus, when determining initially whether the State’s penological 
interests require imposition of a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court can consider the entire 
background of the defendant, including his employment history and financial resources.” Id. at 669–70. 
20. See, e.g., Appleman, supra note 7, at 1490 (“In 1983, the Supreme Court finally eliminated 
debtor's prison in Bearden v. Georgia, holding that imprisoning a probationer who was unable to pay 
off his legal debts violated the Equal Protection Clause.”).  
21. See, e.g., Hampson supra note 18, at 35 (explaining that because there was no clear holding 
by the Court, “state and federal appellate courts have affirmed that some effort to find employment is 
required, and some have put the burden on the debtor or have established a burden-shifting framework”). 
22. Kurin, Indebted to Injustice: The Meaning of “Willfulness” in a Georgia v. Bearden Ability 
to Pay Hearing, 27 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 265, 291–92 (2017).   
23. Jessica M. Eaglin, Improving Economic Sanctions in the States, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1837, 
1854–55 (2014); see also ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA, & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 1, 21–22 (2010) (describing that if a 
probationer smoked and had not paid anything since the previous court date, an Illinois judge would find 
that he or she had willfully refused to pay; and in Michigan, a judge may simply inquire whether or not 
the petitioner had cable television and then find he or she to have willfully refused). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/17
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While Bearden remains the most recent relevant case for indigent 
defendants’ LFOs, the Supreme Court has shown its narrow support for 
indigent parties’ rights in several civil cases.24 Outside the area of indigent 
defendants, the Court also found a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment in United States v. Bajakajian.25 
Debtors’ prisons have been around for thousands of years, dating back to 
biblical times and codified in Roman law, though the Roman Senate 
eventually prohibited them.26 England had a long history of debtors’ 
prisons,27 famously depicted by Dickens. The tradition of English debtors’ 
prisons was carried on in the American colonies, complete with horrific 
conditions.28 After a push for reform, Congress abolished debtors’ prisons 
for federal offenses in 1832, and a majority of states followed suit by the 
1870s.29  
Though formal debtors’ prisons fell out of favor in American society, 
there has been a push in the past several decades for an offender-funded 
justice system in which the costs are passed on to the offenders rather than 
taxpayers.30 It should be noted that the Tennessee Administrative Office of 
 
 
24. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996) (holding that both the Equal Protection and 
Due Process clauses are violated when parental rights are terminated and the parent is prevented from 
appealing the decision because he or she is unable to afford the fees associated with it); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding that it was a violation of due process for indigent women 
to be barred from beginning divorce proceedings when they could not afford the fees, because of the 
importance of marriage and the “state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this 
relationship”).  
25. 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998) (holding that a civil forfeiture of $357,144 for failure to report 
property in excess of $10,000 is a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
because the forfeiture was punitive in nature and thus a fine, and the fine was “grossly disproportional 
to the gravity of his offense”); see also Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (applying the Excessive 
Fines Clause to the states). 
26. Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 
75 MD. L. REV. 486, 494–95 (2016).  
27. Kurin, supra note 22, at 272.  
28. Id. at 272–74. Quarters were described as a “human slaughter house,” and debtors were not 
given meal rations, unlike other prisoners—families, friends, and local aid organizations were expected 
to provide food, clothing, and fuel for them. Id.; see also Appleman, supra note 7, at 1489 (describing 
debtors’ prisons in the United States following the Revolutionary War).  
29. Appleman, supra note 7, at 1489; Kurin, supra note 22, at 274.  
30. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 1, 2 (2015) (“In the 1990s, policy 
makers began arguing that taxpayers should not bear responsibility for these increasing costs, but rather 
the individuals convicted of crimes.”); Anderson, supra note 13, at 194 (“As the costs of enforcement 
and incarceration skyrocketed during the drug wars, public pressure to reduce costs prompted legislators 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the Courts estimates seventy-five percent of people prosecuted for crimes 
in Tennessee are indigent,31 and thus less likely to be able to pay off their 
debts. While the offender-funded system may appeal to some taxpayers, we 
do not always know the amount of fees and fines being collected.32 Some 
states have conducted studies to determine the efficiency of using court debt 
as a revenue generator and found that these laws fail to generate revenue.33 
A 2015 Council of Economic Advisers report found that “[d]espite their 
goal of increasing revenue to fund local criminal justice expenditures, in 
many cases, the costs of collection may exceed revenues from fines and fees 
due to the high direct costs of collecting debt and the low rate of 
collection.”34  
It is difficult to determine just how much revenue is collected from 
administrative court costs and fees in Tennessee, as the state budget does 
not appear to denote which revenue is specifically collected from litigation 
taxes or court costs and fees.35 However, Vidhi S. Joshi found that the state 
 
 
to raise revenue by charging those who ‘use’ the system—criminal offenders—with the costs of 
maintaining it. A staunch anti-tax mentality resulted in drastic shortfalls in local and state budgets, 
exerting similar pressure on local leaders to explore new revenue streams, such as fines and fees.”); Lisa 
Foster, Injustice Under Law: Perpetuating and Criminalizing Poverty Through the Courts, 33 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 695, 703 (2017) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., POLICY AND PROGRAM SERV., STATE AND 
LOCAL EXPENDITURES ON CORRECTIONS AND EDUC. 1 (2016)) (noting that “[f]rom 1979 to 2013, total 
state and local correctional expenditures increased by 324%—from $17 billion to $71 billion) (alteration 
added).  
31. TENN. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, TENNESSEE’S INDIGENT DEFENSE FUND: A REPORT 
TO THE 107TH TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 19 (2011), 
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/docs/aoc_indigent_defense_fund_report.pdf 
[perma.cc/WX8L-KRAU]. 
32. Sobol, supra note 26, at 539 (recommending an accountability system to monitor and track 
the LFOs collected).  
33. ROOPAL PATEL & MEGHNA PHILIP, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A TOOLKIT FOR ACTION, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 1 (2012). Massachusetts and Rhode Island both conducted studies that 
ultimately affected legislation. Id. at 11–13 (“Following the report of the Special Commission, 
Massachusetts did not adopt a state-wide jail fee. . . . [Researchers in Rhode Island found] that less 
incarceration for court debt had resulted in significant savings for the state . . . . [And] Rhode Island 
courts actually increased the amount of funds collected yearly by $160,599.”). “Such studies can show 
lawmakers that the imposition and enforcement of fees and fines has both financial and social costs, and 
that these laws fail to generate revenue.” Id. at 3. 
34. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, supra note 30, at 5. The report suggests that increasing 
the availability of exemption waivers, reforming bail conditions, and increasing pre-trial release could 
all be effective measures to combat unwieldy criminal justice debt. Id. at 6–8. 
35. STATE OF TENNESSEE, THE BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2017-2018 (2017), 
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/finance/budget/documents/2018BudgetDocumentVol1.pdf 
[perma.cc/5DVE-M6MB]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/17
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litigation tax (which is $29.50 and applies to all criminal charges) “has 
raised almost $9 million annually for the past few years.”36 The budget for 
Shelby County is clearer, explaining that the “Fines, Fees, & Permits” 
category includes fees collected by the Courts, County Clerk, Register, and 
Trustee.37 It expects to generate $68,382,520 in 201938 but this number does 
not represent the true amount of court costs collected because the category 
is much larger than just court costs and fees; it encompasses permits as well.  
A 2015 local investigative news report sheds some light on this issue.39 
For the fiscal year 2015, the Shelby County Criminal Court collected $5.7 
million in fees and fines, but there is an outstanding balance due of $555 
million dating back to 1995.40 The average bill for a defendant or former 
defendant was approximately $1,100. A Criminal Court clerk stated, “Most 
of my counterparts across the state are in agreement that fees and court costs 
are getting somewhat out of hand.”41 
 
B. Tennessee Judicial History of Indigent Defendants’ Debt 
 
In several instances, Tennessee federal and state courts predated the 
United States Supreme Court in extending constitutional protection to 
indigent defendants imprisoned for failure to pay court costs or fines.42 
Preceding Williams, Tate, and Bearden, a Tennessee federal district court 
found that it was unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment to jail 
indigent defendants for failure to pay court costs.43 Furthermore, the same 
 
 
36. Vidhi S. Joshi, Sentenced to Debt, 53-MAY TENN. B.J. 18, 19 (2017).  
37. SHELBY COUNTY, TENN., GENERAL FUND SUMMARY: FY19 ADOPTED BUDGET 66 (2018), 
https://www.shelbycountytn.gov/DocumentCenter/View/33017/General-Fund-FY19-Adopted-
Consolidated-numbered [https://perma.cc/R7H4-55KP].  
38. Id. at 51.  
39. Debt to Society: How Ex-Offenders and Taxpayers Continue Paying for Crime (WREG 
television broadcast Nov. 19, 2015), http://wreg.com/2015/11/19/debt-to-society-how-ex-offenders-
and-taxpayers-continue-paying-for-crimes/ [perma.cc/U8XD-SHJV]. 
40. Id. The $5.7 million is just over one percent of the $555 million outstanding.  
41. Id.  
42. See Walter Kurtz, Pay or Stay: Incarceration of Minor Criminal Offenders for Nonpayment 
of Fines and Fees, 51-JUL TENN. B.J. 16 (2015), for a thorough overview of several of the Tennessee 
cases. 
43. Anderson v. Ellington, 300 F. Supp. 789, 793 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (“[I]n Tennessee, costs in 
a criminal case are not part of the punishment, and we therefore hold that the statutes permitting 
imprisonment for their nonpayment are void in that respect as violative of the Thirteenth Amendment.”). 
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court found that imprisonment for failure to pay jail fees was a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.44 In 1971, the Tennessee Court of Criminal 
Appeals held in State v. Walding that an indigent defendant who had served 
the imprisonment portion of his sentence was entitled to release despite 
having not paid his fine.45 While this case preceded the Bearden decision, 
the Walding court was convinced it was properly following the Supreme 
Court’s line of decision from Williams and Tate.46 In State v. Dye, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court applied the Bearden test, holding that an indigent 
defendant’s probation should not be revoked when medical problems 
prevented the individual from working, the defendant was not willfully 
refusing to pay, and an installment plan was an appropriate alternate mode 
of punishment.47 Later cases have been distinguished from Dye, but the 
standard for willful refusals to pay fees and fines articulated by Dye and 
Bearden is still good law.48  
 
C. Tennessee Statutes Pertaining to Criminal Justice Debt 
 
The Tennessee state legislature has also picked up where the judiciary 
left off, going even farther than the Bearden court by providing that no 
 
 
44. Dillehay v. White, 264 F. Supp. 164, 167 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (holding that because jail fees 
do not accrue against the rich because they can post bond, “Tennessee’s practice of imprisoning indigent 
misdemeanants to work out jail fees which accrue during their pre-trial detention is unconstitutional” 
under the Equal Protection Clause). 
45. 477 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971) (finding that the defendant could pay off his 
fine on an installment plan rather than remaining incarcerated to work it off at a rate of $5 per day). 
46. Id. (“Three recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions enunciate the controlling principle . . . . 
Although these cases are distinguishable on their precise facts from the case sub judice, the following 
dictum from Tate clearly covers it.”) (citations omitted). 
47. 715 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Tenn. 1986). The defendant made a prima facie case that “[his] state of 
health and financial condition were such that it cannot be said that he, ‘willfully refused to pay or failed 
to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay.’” Id. (quoting Bearden v. 
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672).  
48. See, e.g., State v. Riffey, No. E2011-00641-CCA-R3CD, 2012 WL 762320, at *1 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 2012) (holding that the lower court erred in revoking appellant’s probation for failure to pay 
court fines but the probation was rightfully revoked for other reasons); State v. Armstrong, No. E2004-
02495-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1981787, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (revoking probation for an 
indigent defendant who repeatedly violated the terms of her probation beyond just not paying her fines 
and fees—an example of a “willful refusal” under Dye and Bearden); State v. Cooper, No. E1999-01810-
CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1369510, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (same). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/17
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defendant shall be imprisoned for failure to pay court costs.49 The legislature 
has also mandated that a court may provide an installment plan50 or require 
community service,51 further codifying the ideals of Bearden. Courts may 
look into the “financial and family situation” of defendants who are unable 
to pay—which is more than required by Bearden.52 The Tennessee 
legislature has also given certain judges the discretion to waive court costs.53 
Judicial discretion is often applied in Shelby County to waive at least some 
of the debt that former offenders have incurred.54 
Recently, Tennessee State House Bill 839 partially amended the driver’s 
license revocation statute by eliminating the revocation of licenses for those 
convicted of driving offenses who have unpaid fees and fines.55 The bill 
passed the House 96–0 and the Senate 30-0; Governor Lee signed it on May 
22, 2019, and it went into effect on July 1, 2019.56 While the law alleviates 
the burden for those who would lose their license because of unpaid driving 
 
 
49. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-105(a) (2017) (“Costs and litigation taxes due may be collected 
in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action, but shall not be deemed part of the penalty, and no 
person shall be imprisoned under this section in default of payment of costs or litigation taxes.”). 
50. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-101(a)(3) (2017) (“That the defendant pay the fine in specified 
portions or installments at designated periodic intervals and that the portions be remitted to a designated 
official, who shall report to the court in the event of any failure to comply with the order.”). 
51. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-25-123(c)(2) (2017) (allowing the clerk of either general sessions or 
criminal courts to institute a community service program “in lieu of full payment for court costs and 
litigation taxes”; the clerk may adopt guidelines, and the defendant can complete such a program if 
accepted.). 
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-104(a) (2017).  
53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-25-123(b) (2017) (“Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the 
presiding judge of a court of general sessions may suspend the court costs and the litigation tax required 
by §§ 67-4-602–67-4-606, for any indigent criminal defendant, as in the presiding judge’s opinions the 
equities of the case require.”). 
54. See Shelby County Public Defender’s Office, Collateral Consequences (unpublished 
handbook) (on file with the author). Based on my experience, interns in the Shelby County Public 
Defender’s Office receive a handbook entitled “Collateral Consequences” that contains the protocol of 
investigating and preparing motions for the fees to be waived. Interns often prepare the motions and 
present them to the public defenders, who bring them before a judge. This is a multi-step process that 
requires the client to be present in the courtroom. The number of clients wanting to petition for waiver 
far outstrips the capacity of the public defender’s office. 
55. H.B. 839, 111th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2019); 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts 438-1.  
56. HB0839: Bill History, TENN. GEN. ASSEMB., 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=HB0839 
[perma.cc/64BJ-QSGV] (last visited September 5, 2019).  
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tickets and fees, it does not apply to those who have been convicted of 
offenses other than driving.57 
 
D. Burdens of LFOs on Indigent Ex-Offenders in Tennessee 
While Tennessee has both judicial and legislative safeguards that protect 
indigent defendants from imprisonment for failure to pay court costs and 
fees, there are still significant penalties—particularly the revocation of 
driver’s licenses58—for those with outstanding debts. The statute 
automatically and mandatorily revokes the license if not all of the fees and 
fines are paid within one year of the disposition of the case, and the license 
may not be reinstated until all LFOs are paid off or judicially waived.59 The 
statute does not require a hearing to determine whether or not someone has 
the ability to pay,60 implicating Bearden’s indigency-hearing requirement.61 
There is a hardship provision that permits a payment plan, but the judge 
does not have to consider whether the person can pay.62 Additionally, a stay 
of revocation may be issued for travel necessary for employment, the 
serious illness of the person or an immediate family member, or 
participation in a recovery court, but the stay may not be continued past six 
months.63 If the person fails to make payments according to the plan for 
three consecutive months after the stay, the license is revoked.64  
 
 
57. Id. In fact, the Shelby County District Attorney clarified that those who are behind on child 
support payments could still face license revocation. Stacy Jacobson, Bill to Halt License Suspension 
Could Impact Many Memphis Drivers, WREG (May 1, 2019), https://wreg.com/2019/05/01/tennessee-
lawmakers-ok-license-suspension-bill/ [perma.cc/JXU3-UE4U]. 
58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-105(b)(1) (2017) (“A license issued under title 55 for any operator 
or chauffeur shall be revoked by the commissioner of safety if the licensee has not paid all litigation 
taxes, court costs, and fines assessed as a result of disposition of any offense under the criminal laws of 
this state within one (1) year of the date of disposition of the offense. The license shall remain revoked 
until such time as the person whose license has been revoked provides proof to the commissioner of 
safety that all litigation taxes, court costs, and fines have been paid.”).  
59. Id. While H.B. 839 amends the statute to prevent revocation of those with driving offenses, 
those convicted of other crimes would still face revocation. See supra note 57.  
60. Complaint at 6, Thomas v. Haslam, 3:17-cv-00005 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 2017). 
61. BANNON, NAGRECHA, & DILLER, supra note 22, at 21–22; Eaglin, supra note 22, at 1854–
55; Kurin, supra note 22, at 291–92.  
62. Complaint, supra note 60, at 6–7. 
63. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-105(b)(3) (2017). 
64. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-105(b)(4) (2017).  
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In Tennessee, 146,211 drivers have had their licenses revoked since 
2012.65  Much of Tennessee is inaccessible by public transportation66 and 
many jobs require a driver’s license as a prerequisite of employment,67 
making a driver’s license “a lifeline in this state.”68 Other authors have also 
discussed the barriers that people face with the revocation of driver’s 
licenses for failure to pay off criminal-justice debt, though it is not specific 
to Tennessee. They note the dearth of employment opportunities without a 
license.69 Furthermore, losing a license can incur more debt with 
reinstatement fees70 or even lead to incarceration if people are forced to 
drive without their license and lack other means of transportation.71 In 
January 2017, two men filed a class-action lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of the mandatory revocation of driver’s licenses in 
Tennessee.72 The suit alleged the Equal Protection Clause is violated 
because the statute deprives an indigent people of the ability to drive simply 
 
 
65. Joshi, supra note 36, at 20.  
66. Id. at 20–21; see also Complaint, supra note 60, at 10 (“Public transportation is unreliable or 
lacking entirely in many parts of Tennessee and people often have no way to get to work without driving. 
. . . Even in areas with public transportation services, those services do not meaningfully reach significant 
portions of the impoverished population.”). In its opinion, the Middle District of Tennessee 
acknowledged the finding that ninety-two percent of Tennesseans drive to work. Thomas v. Haslam, 
329 F. Supp. 3d 475, 491 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). For discussion of the Thomas opinion, see infra note 75 
and accompanying text.  
67. Joshi, supra note 36, at 20–21; see also Complaint, supra note 60, at 9–10 (noting that 
positions as an “automotive technician, cable installation technician, caregiver, construction worker, 
delivery driver, housecleaner, HVAC technician, landscaping crew member, maintenance worker, 
plumber and plumber’s helper, pressure washer, truck driver, truck washer, unarmed security officer, 
valet parking attendant, and warehouse worker” often require a driver’s license as a condition of 
employment). 
68. Joshi, supra note 36, at 20–21.  
69. See BANNON, NAGRECHA, & DILLER, supra note 22, at 28 (“Similarly, suspending driver’s 
licenses for a failure to pay criminal justice debt can make it difficult for many people to search for and 
hold down jobs.”); Kurin, supra note 22, at 287 (“‘42% of suspended drivers lost their jobs and 45% 
remained unemployed’ during the suspension period. . . . ‘80% of participants were disqualified from 
employment opportunities because their license was suspended’”) (citing 2006 N.J. MOTOR VEHICLES 
AFFORDABILITY AND FAIRNESS TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT 12, 38 (2006)).   
70. Sobol, supra note 26, at 519 (“Once a driver's license is suspended, reinstatement and late 
fees are added to the original fine, and an individual must pay this debt before she can regain her 
license.”). 
71. See generally John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison, 
4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 439, 440–42 (2005) (telling the story of Sally, who was incarcerated for 
driving on suspended license that was only suspended because she could not afford the administrative 
fees associated with an unpaid traffic ticket).  
72. Complaint, supra note 60.  
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because they are too poor to pay—a consequence only faced by debtors.73 
The Due Process Clause is implicated because of the automatic revocation 
of the license without notice or opportunity to be heard and because the 
statute does not inquire into ability to pay.74 On July 2, 2018, the Middle 
District of Tennessee ruled in favor the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment holding that, subject to a “heightened” rational basis review, the 
driver’s license revocation statute was violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause.75 The Court emphasized that an indigent debtor is more harshly 
penalized than one who can afford to pay76 and that the revocation of a 
driver’s license actually inhibits a debtor from obtaining the means to repay 
the debt, making the statute inherently “counterproductive.”77 The District 
Court’s decision is currently under appellate review.78 
 
E. Constitutional Arguments Pertaining to Criminal-Justice Debt 
 
There are a number of arguments as to why both imprisonment for failure 
to pay fees and the imposition of such fees are unconstitutional. Laura I. 
Appleman analyzes the different fees that often accrue for defendants; some 
accrue well before a judge or jury decides the case. Appleman sorts these 
fees into four categories:79 pre-trial fees such as booking fees, bail 
“administrative” fees, dismissal fees, public defender application fees, and 
private probation fees;80 adjudication fees like court fees and disability and 
 
 
73. Id. at 17.  
74. Id. 
75. Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475, 479 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). The “heightened” rational 
basis review is applicable when there is a “politically unpopular group and a law affirmatively and 
unjustifiably inflicting harm on them.” Id. at 493.   
76. Id. at 480. 
77. Id. at 483–84. The Court also held that under procedural due process, licensees are entitled 
to notice and pre-revocation hearings. Id. at 496.  
78. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Thomas v. Haslam, No. 18-5766 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2018). The 
State challenges the usage of the heightened rational basis review and the holding that licensees are 
entitled to a pre-revocation hearing. Id. at 15–16.  
79. Appleman, supra note 7, at 1492–1516. 
80. Id. at 1492–98. Booking fees are accrued when an arrestee is processed at the jail; bail 
“administrative” fees are assessed when a defendant posts bail; dismissal fees may be incurred when 
minor offenders can occasionally pay to have their charges dropped; indigent defendants can be charged 
to apply for a public defender through the public defender application fee; and private probation fees are 
accrued when private firms are contracted to provide probation services and collect fees for their work. 
Id. 
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translation fees;81 post-conviction fees including jail and prison fees, 
statutory penalties, post-conviction levies, criminal restitution, probation, 
parole, and post-release supervision penalties, community service and 
expungement charges;82 and, “additional financial impositions” similar to 
late penalties, interest, and collection charges and child support debt.83 An 
itemized list of fees from Shelby County has twenty-five different potential 
fees one can incur.84 The fees range from jail fees and clerk fees to  litigation 
taxes and indigent fees.85 
For fees that are assessed prior to a conviction, Appleman argues that 
when criminal-justice debt has morphed from “regulatory to punitive,” the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial demands the community dictate the 
imposed punishment, rather than allowing the government to unilaterally 
assess fees.86 Citing a line of Supreme Court cases,87 Appleman argues that 
with the “reinvigoration”88 of the Sixth Amendment jury right and because 
“imposing criminal justice debt results in punishment,”89 assessing fees and 
 
 
81. Id. at 1498–1500. Court fees can include a variety of things, from DNA test fees to billing 
the cost of the public defender. Id. at 1498. Disability and translation fees are assessed when a defendant 
requires an interpreter or other support because of a disability or being a non-English speaker. Id. at 
1500. 
82. Id. at 1500-13. Jail and prison fees are those accrued for being housed in jail or prison and 
are often assessed even if the defendant is acquitted. Id. at 1506. Statutory penalties are fines associated 
with the crime, with some jurisdictions attaching a surcharge on top of the fine. Id. at 1503–04. Post-
conviction levies are assessed to repay the justice system for things such as investigations, arrest 
warrants, and a jury. Id. at 1499. Criminal restitution is designed to repay the victim for harm caused. 
Id. at 1505–06. Probation, parole, and post-release supervision penalties include paying for GPS 
monitoring, fees for the private probation, and drug testing. Id. at 1508. Community service and 
expungement fees are required to complete community service or to have charges expunged. Id. at 1511–
13. 
83. Id. at 1513–16. Late penalties, interest, and collection fees are all penalties assessed for 
failure to pay other fees in a timely fashion. Id. Child support still accrues while the parent is imprisoned, 
so that debt is added to the rest of the LFOs. Id. 
84. I obtained a listing of fees from the Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk.  
85. Appleman, supra note 7, at 1513–16.  
86. Id. at 1516.  
87. Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 43 
(2012); Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)).  
88. Id.  
89. Id. at 1520–21 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–169 (1963) 
(providing benchmarks to determine if a sanction has a punitive purpose or effect) and United States v. 
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (finding that certain civil forfeitures are fines and grossly 
disproportionate to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment)). 
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fines prior to a conviction is a violation of one’s Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial.90 Some defendants have had varying degrees of success arguing 
that booking fees are a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; at least two courts have found that a version of booking fees 
is unconstitutional, while another has found the opposite.91 Sometimes, 
former offenders who still have criminal-justice debt may be unaware of 
how much they owe or when the due dates are, which can lead to increased 
debt through late penalties. Such penalties may be construed as a violation 
of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, if proper 
notice has not been given.92 In a positive move, the Supreme Court recently 
held that a Colorado statute that required exonerated defendants to prove 
their innocence by clear and convincing evidence in order to be refunded 
costs, fees, and restitution was a violation of the due process clause.93 In a 
similar vein, the Court in United States v. Bajakajian found that certain 
types of civil forfeiture are unconstitutional.94  
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
Over the latter half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court regularly 
protected indigent defendants’ due process rights. Beginning with Griffin v. 
 
 
90. Id. at 1494 (“Any financial sanction imposed before conviction or the adjudication of 
punishment cannot stand, as this usurps the role of the jury and community, a role specifically reserved 
under the Sixth Amendment jury trial right.”).  
91. See, e.g., id. at 1493–1494 (citing Allen v. Leis, 213 F. Supp. 2d 819, 832–34 (S.D. Ohio 
2002) (holding there is a violation of due process when a county claims a small booking fee from 
arrestees without notice or hearing) and Roehl v. City of Naperville, 857 F. Supp. 2d 707, 717 (N.D. Ill. 
2012) (holding there is a violation of due process when an automatic arrest fee is imposed without any 
procedural mechanism to properly impose it)). But see id. at 1492–1493 (citing Markadonatos v. Village 
of Woodridge, 739 F.3d 984, 986–87 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that booking fees are constitutional when 
they are imposed equally on all arrestees whether or not the arrest is made with probable cause)).  
92. Anderson, supra note 13, at 214. While Anderson’s analysis deals primarily with municipal 
fines and charges and the lack of notice provided to the citizens of Ferguson, Missouri, her Fourteenth 
Amendment procedural due process argument is relevant to this context. Id. 213–14. She argues that the 
lack of proper notice constituted a violation of due process. Id. at 214. This argument extends to people 
who may not have been afforded proper notice about their criminal justice debt.  
93. Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017). This Note concentrates more broadly on the 
effect of costs and fees on defendants, regardless of whether they are exonerated, but this opinion is a 
positive acknowledgment by the Court nonetheless.   
94. 524 U.S. 321, 324 (finding that civil forfeiture is unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause if it is deemed both punitive in nature and grossly 
disproportionate to the offense).  
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Illinois, the Court found that when indigent defendants were prevented from 
appealing decisions because of a lack of funds or when they were being 
imprisoned for longer than the maximum sentence for failing to pay a fine, 
the Due Process Clause was violated since the penalties only affected 
debtors.95 Bearden v. Georgia was the most expansive decision; it protects 
probationers’ liberty rights when they do not make a payment, absent 
evidence of a willful failure to pay.96 The Court also showed its support for 
indigent people in civil cases through Boddie v. Connecticut97 and M.L.B. v. 
S.L.J.98 In the 2016 term, the Supreme Court issued one of its most 
defendant-favorable decisions yet in Nelson v. Colorado.99 This series of 
cases demonstrate an arc toward the protection of indigent parties’ rights in 
the legal system.100 While the changes in law are undeniably important and 
positive, it is still not enough. The Bearden decision has been interpreted in 
a number of ways,101 with most courts giving only brief or perfunctory 
hearings on the ability to pay costs and fees.102 With such a lack of 
uniformity among courts’ applications of Bearden, the law is weak.103 While 
the Supreme Court seems to have been trying to protect the indigent 
defendant’s rights, later cases demonstrate lower courts’ inclination to only 
pay lip service to the language of Bearden.104 In the future, the Court should 
reinforce its Bearden language by clarifying the requirements of a Bearden 
hearing.105  
 
 
95. 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).  
96. 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983).  
97. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
98. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).  
99. 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017).  
100. It should be noted that, in general, the rights that have been protected are procedural due 
process rights, not substantive ones.  
101. See Appleman, supra note 7, at 1490 (interpreting Bearden as a case that eliminated debtors’ 
prisons); see also Hampson, supra note 18, at 35 (interpreting Bearden as a case requiring some variation 
of a hearing to determine indigency).  
102. See supra text accompanying note 22.  
103. With a clear willful-refusal standard that should be uniform across the country, there should 
not be such variation among the courts. The arbitrary nature of many of these hearings—particularly 
ones in which the judge asks the defendant if he or she smokes or owned popular sneakers as a sign of 
expendable income—means that indigent defendants are treated differently not only because of their 
socioeconomic status but also depending on the jurisdiction or the presiding judge. See supra note 23.   
104. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 48.  
105. The judiciary would also benefit from a clarification of the discretion a judge has when 
determining the factors for a willful refusal to pay. Factors such as jobs and family life should be taken 
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Tennessee has a strong legislative and judicial history on this issue, but 
the reality of indigent defendants’ plight is much different than the language 
of the statutes and decisions. In State v. Walding, the Tennessee Court of 
Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court’s release of a defendant who was 
unable to pay his fine.106 Similar to several of the interpretations of Bearden 
hearings, the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Dye found that medical 
conditions prevented the defendant from working and paying off costs, so 
an installment plan was a more appropriate remedy than incarceration.107 
The Tennessee legislature has also enacted several statutes that support 
indigent defendants, including no imprisonment for failure to pay costs or 
litigation taxes,108 provision of installment plans109 and community 
service,110 a more rigorous set of factors for a Bearden hearing,111 and 
judicial discretion for waiver of costs.112 Taken together, these measures 
appear to provide a strong level of protection for indigent defendants. 
However, an examination of the reality for indigent defendants after they 
are released illustrates that these statutes are insufficient to provide 
complete relief for the formerly incarcerated.113  
The greatest barrier facing indigent former offenders is section 40-24-
105(b)(1) of the Tennessee Code—the revocation of driver’s licenses for 
 
 
into account, rather than inquiring into whether or not the defendant has cable television. At the very 
least, however, uniformity across court systems would be positive.   
106. 477 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971). Before Bearden, the Tennessee courts 
recognized the problems of imprisoning a defendant because of an inability to pay. This decision, along 
with several Tennessee federal district court decisions, see supra notes 43–44 and accompanying cases, 
set the stage for a judicial environment that seemingly protects indigent defendants from imprisonment 
for failure to pay.  
107. 715 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Tenn. 1986). This opinion seems to fully take into account the spirit of 
Bearden and grapple with whether or not the defendant was “willfully” refusing to pay—a process that 
the Supreme Court seemed to indicate was necessary. Id. at 39–41. State v. Dye is still good law in 
Tennessee, but recent cases seem to only give the Bearden test a cursory once-over while the Dye court 
so carefully applied it. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 48.  
108. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-104(a) (2017). 
109. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-101(a)(3) (2017).  
110. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-25-123(c)(2) (2017).   
111. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-104(a) (2017) (allowing for a court to examine the defendant’s 
“financial and family situation”). 
112. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-25-123(b) (2017).   
113. Some may argue that the formerly incarcerated should not be eligible for such relief since it 
is a part of the price for committing a crime. This idea of an offender-funded system is challenged later 
in this section.   
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those who do not pay all litigation taxes, court costs, and fines.114 While the 
statute was likely enacted to encourage payment of such costs, it has had the 
opposite effect. In Shelby County, over 22,000 people have had their 
licenses revoked,115 while there is an outstanding balance of $555 million 
owed in court costs and fees dating back to 1995116 with an average of 
$1,100 per debtor.117 This comparison is imperfect,118 but the separate 
effects on the formerly incarcerated and the county are clear. Without 
driver’s licenses, employment prospects are low since a number of jobs that 
could be open for ex-offenders require a driver’s license.119 Without a 
source of income and the necessary expenses mounting, people will likely 
fall deeper and deeper in debt.120 As Joshi notes, public transportation is 
simply not a viable alternative for a number of people across the state.121 In 
a vicious cycle, an ex-offender is unlikely to get a job to pay off his or her 
court costs and fees without a driver’s license, but, prior to the law enacted 
in July 2019, a driver’s license could not be reobtained until the court costs 
and fees are paid off.122  
 
 
114. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-105(b)(1) (2017). 
115. Debt to Society, supra note 39.  
116. Id.  
117. Id. 
118. The Shelby County General Sessions Court, which provided the data for revoked licenses, is 
a separate court from Shelby County Criminal Court, from which the outstanding balance is drawn. 
Additionally, the data is from 2015 and before. While the court costs balance is from 1995-2015, we do 
not know the time period of the driver’s license revocations.  
119. See sources cited supra note 66.  
120. A person’s immediate priority is to cover everyday expenses like providing shelter and food 
for one’s family. The abstract debt of court costs may pale in comparison to the urgent and concrete 
need of keeping the lights on. Even if someone prioritized the payback of the court costs, obtaining a 
job can be incredibly difficult for someone with a criminal record, especially without a driver’s license. 
See, e.g., Joshi, supra note 36, at 21. 
121. Joshi, supra note 36, at 20–21. This Note primarily concentrates on Shelby County, an urban 
area. Shelby County’s public transportation, however, is not nearly as developed as other major 
American cities, still presenting a massive barrier to those without driver’s licenses. See ADIE TOMER 
ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., MISSED OPPORTUNITY: TRANSIT AND JOBS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 36 
(2011) (In a survey of 100 metropolitan areas, Memphis—which makes up most of Shelby County—
ranked 69th). Moreover, rural areas are especially affected by a lack of public transportation. See Joshi, 
supra note 36, at 20. 
122. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-105(b)(4) (2017). While H.B. 839 eliminates the revocation of 
licenses for those convicted of driving offenses who have unpaid fees and fines, it only applies to those 
convicted of driving offenses—not all offenders. See infra text accompanying notes 55–57. The cycle is 
continuous, increasing the debt owed by the ex-offenders while simultaneously denying them a feasible 
option of employment. Being without regular means of transportation imposes other, non-quantifiable 
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Beyond the pragmatic concerns of an ex-offender being unable to get a 
job, there is also a constitutional question at hand. In a recent decision, the 
Middle District of Tennessee found violations of the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses.123 The alleged equal protection violation mirrored the 
argument in cases like Tate v. Short124 because only an indigent defendant 
faces the driver’s license revocation.125 The proposed due process violation 
was similar to the violation found in Bearden v. Georgia126 with the ex-
offender arguing that the automatic revocation of the license is a violation 
of due process.127 The due process claim presents an intriguing argument 
for the court. Following in the vein of Bearden, the defendant argued that 
he has the constitutional right to be heard on his failure to pay court costs 
and the effect of a revoked license.128  
The Middle District of Tennessee’s decision in Thomas v. Haslam was a 
refreshing course of action, but it may be short-lived with the current appeal 
to the conservative Sixth Circuit. Likewise, House Bill 839 provides relief 
for those convicted of driving offenses, but that is not the only class of 
people affected by unconstitutional fees and fines. Rather, indigent 
defendants convicted of non-driving offenses—including nonpayment of 
child support—would still face license revocation. While this bill is an 
important step forward toward codifying protection for some people, it is 
not enough. The harm that the Middle District of Tennessee describes in 
Thomas v. Haslam still looms over those with non-driving offenses. While 
 
 
costs, such as difficulty getting to and from grocery stores, doctor’s appointments, children’s schools, 
or court-mandated appointments. The cycle may also contribute to an environment that promotes 
recidivism—a climate in which people feel they have no alternative but to break the law in order to 
provide for their families. See, e.g., ROOPAL PATEL & MEGHNA PHILIP, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A TOOLKIT FOR ACTION, 5 (2012); Beckett & Harris, supra note 6, at n.14. 
123. Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). 
124. 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause where the 
government only fines people who can afford to pay the fine while imprisoning those who cannot).    
125. A defendant who can afford it will simply pay the court costs and fees and never face the 
issue of having the license revoked. The Middle District held that this is an equal protection issue 
because the revocation uniquely affects debtors. Thomas, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 480.  
126. 461 U.S. 660, 672–63 (1983) (holding that the state cannot revoke probation for failure to 
pay unless there is evidence that the probationer willfully refused to pay).  
127. Complaint, Thomas v. Haslam, 3:17-cv-00005 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 2017). It is a violation of 
due process because the ex-offender was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard nor did the court 
inquire into ability to pay. Thomas, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 496.  
128. Complaint, Thomas v. Haslam, 3:17-cv-00005 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 2017). 
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the driving-offenses class is protected under the district court’s decision, the 
Sixth Circuit could reverse.  
To some people, an offender-funded justice system, rather than a 
taxpayer-funded one, may sound both just and fiscally responsible. 
However, this idea has not been successful in reality. A great majority of 
criminal defendants in Tennessee are indigent,129 and thus unlikely to be 
able to pay off their debts. Moreover, studies have found that some of these 
laws fail to generate revenue.130 The state and county budgets are unclear 
about the revenue generated from the court costs and fees, but the numbers 
from the WREG-TV “Debt to Society” report are staggering and suggest 
that the courts are collecting only a fraction of the debts.131 The Shelby 
County Criminal Court Clerk, whose job it is to collect those debts, even 
questioned the utility of this system.132 With such gaps between collected 
and owed debt,133 the system does not seem to be working for taxpayers, the 
state, or the defendant.  
Appleman presents a compelling Sixth Amendment argument regarding 
fees that are assessed prior to conviction.134 However, with the recent 
Nelson v. Colorado decision, it seems unlikely that this argument will gain 
any real traction.135 In the series of cases that Appleman cites about booking 
fees and a potential Fourteenth Amendment claim,136 the courts are divided 
 
 
129. TENN. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 31 (stating it is “generally agreed that 
approximately 75% of those being prosecuted by the district attorney will be indigent”).  
130. PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 33, at 11–13. However, Tennessee was not specifically listed in 
the report.  
131. Debt to Society, supra note 39.  
132. Id. (“Most of my counterparts across the state are in agreement that fees and court costs are 
getting somewhat out of hand.”).  
133. Id. (Shelby County Criminal Court collected $5.7 million in fees in 2015, contrasted with a 
balance sheet dating back to 1995 of $555 million).  
134. See supra text accompanying note 86. Fees that are assessed prior to conviction “usurp” the 
roles of the jury and community, which the Sixth Amendment specifically protects. Appleman, supra 
note 7. 
135. 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) (finding that it was a violation of the Due Process Clause to force 
defendants who were exonerated to then prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence in order 
to get a refund). In light of that decision, states may not be as tight-fisted when faced with exonerated 
defendants requesting a refund. On the other hand, once a defendant has been convicted, a court seems 
unlikely to find that a constitutional violation for fees that were incurred while the case was working its 
way through the justice system.   
136. Two courts found a procedural due process violation for assessment of booking fees; one 
court held that they were constitutional. See Allen v. Leis, 213 F. Supp. 2d 819, 832–34 (S.D. Ohio 
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and will likely remain so. While there is a compelling claim that automatic 
fees for booking are unconstitutional because there is not a proper 
mechanism in place to impose the fee,137 many courts are unlikely to find 
this constitutional argument persuasive for the same reasons that the Sixth 
Amendment argument would likely fail. While it would be threading a 
needle, an Eighth Amendment case modeled off of Bajakajian138 could 
theoretically be accepted by a court.139  
 
III. PROPOSAL 
 
Scholars and advocates have suggested a number of different reforms to 
criminal-justice debt,140 but many of them are focused specifically on 
debtors’ prisons.141 Tennessee has largely eradicated debtors’ prisons, but 
former defendants still face a number of collateral consequences from their 
debt. The driver’s license revocation statute is a major barrier for indigent 
ex-offenders. As a recent court filing argues, a finding of the statute as 
unconstitutional is necessary.142 Only protecting those with driving offenses 
is not enough. While Thomas v. Haslam concentrates on the constitutional 
arguments against such a statute, the legislature should repeal the statute 
 
 
2002); Roehl v. City of Naperville, 857 F. Supp. 2d 707, 717 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Markadonatos v. Village 
of Woodridge, 739 F.3d 984, 986–87 (7th Cir. 2014). See generally cases cited supra note 91. 
137. E.g., Roehl v. City of Naperville, 857 F. Supp. 2d 707, 717 (N.D. Ill. 2012).  
138. 524 U.S. 321 (1998).  
139. While an application to court costs and fees might be a stretch, there is a colorable argument 
that a fee may be punitive in nature (e.g. a fine assessed as part of sentencing) and grossly 
disproportionate to the offense. While Bajakajian is clear that civil forfeitures should not be grossly 
disproportionate to the offense itself, the Tennessee courts, in its Bearden test, can take family situation 
into account with one’s willful refusal to pay. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-24-104(a) (2017). Thus, there 
could be a potential Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines argument couched in the Bajakajian test. 
140. See, e.g., BANNON, NAGRECHA, & DILLER, supra note 22, at 32–33 (2010) (suggesting 
remedies such as evaluating total debt burden before adding additional debt, exempting indigent 
defendants from user fees, and eliminating public defender fees); COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, 
supra note 30, at 8 (including expanding pre-trial release for low-level offenders); Travis Stearns, Legal 
Financial Obligations: Fulfilling the Promise of Gideon by Reducing the Burden, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR 
SOC. JUST. 963, 977–78 (2013) (proposing, among other reforms, zealous advocacy at Bearden hearings 
and evaluating existing debt before tacking on more fees).  
141. See, e.g., Sobol, supra note 26, at 524–539 (suggesting remedies such as examining whether 
charges and imprisonment should be assessed, prohibiting incarceration for failure to pay reimbursement 
charges, establishing guidelines to determine indigency, providing a system for procedural safeguards 
and protections, and establishing effective enforcement mechanisms).  
142. Complaint, supra note 60, at 17.  
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because of the practical implications. Evidence suggests that the costs borne 
by the indigent debtor far outweigh the relatively slight benefits to the 
government. Allowing debtors—not just those who committed driving 
offenses—to retain their licenses will increase job opportunities and put 
them back to work, eventually enabling them to pay off at least some of 
their court costs.  
Another common-sense reform is based on the lack of Tennessee-specific 
evidence in this field.143 There should be clear accounting maintained at 
both individual county clerks’ offices and at the state level that tracks the 
amount of debt owed and paid. Without this type of data available, it is 
difficult to determine just how significant the issue is. It is challenging to 
support one’s arguments either in support or against criminal-justice reform 
when most of the available evidence is drawn from anecdotal and first-hand 
reports. A more transparent and thorough accounting system should be 
relatively inexpensive to implement and would greatly serve interested 
parties in studying the impact that criminal justice debt has on individuals 
and the government.  
Finally, at least some public defender’s offices carry the weight of 
researching and filing motions for waiver of costs on behalf of indigent 
former offenders.144 While perhaps the most effective solution would 
ultimately be to reduce the amount of debt passed on to indigent defendants, 
a more practical and short-term solution is to devote more resources to the 
public defender’s offices to alleviate some workload. This solution could 
cost almost nothing—even as little as increasing the number of unpaid 
interns each summer with some dedicated to working on waiver petitions 
full-time. Because the motions are fairly routine, undergraduate interns 
could prepare them under attorney supervision. Many judges have proven 
to be amenable to waiving at least some of the fees for indigent defendants, 
and the Shelby County Public Defender’s Office has piles of client letters 
pleading for assistance. If interns, not the already over-worked attorneys, 
help address this issue on a base level, more ex-offenders could have at least 
 
 
143. This assertion is drawn from my efforts to contact the Shelby County Clerk’s Office and the 
State of Tennessee Department of Revenue. I did not encounter anyone who was aware of any collected 
data, and I found that statistics about criminal justice debt were, at the very least, not easily accessible. 
At the most, there is no accounting for the effect criminal-justice debt has on the budgets of these levels 
of government.  
144. The Shelby County Public Defender’s Office performs these tasks.  
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a portion of their fees waived. With a lower remaining balance and a 
reinstated driver’s license, it is not inconceivable that people will be able to 
return to work and pay off the smaller amount while still affording regular 
expenses—rather than perceiving a larger balance as insurmountable.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The issue of criminal-justice debt has a long history and deeply rooted 
problems. However, several small, common-sense reforms could drastically 
change the nature of this issue for Tennesseans across the state. Reinstating 
driver’s licenses for those whose licenses are revoked for failure to pay 
would be a huge step forward, particularly when public transportation in the 
state is limited.145 Alleviating this barrier would open up a gateway of 
opportunities for ex-offenders.146 Creating a more transparent accounting 
process of the criminal justice debt—including the amount owed, the 
amount paid, and the expenses for recouping those costs—would aid both 
legislators and interested parties in assessing the costs and benefits of the 
current criminal-justice debt system. Finally, dedicating more resources to 
public defender’s offices and others that aid ex-offenders could streamline 
the process. Waiving some or all of indigent people’s debts can jumpstart a 
new beginning, allowing people to more easily attain employment, which 
will help them pay off any remaining debt.  
The Supreme Court, and courts across the country, have regularly 
demonstrated a willingness to aid and protect the rights of the indigent 
criminal defendant. While there are colorable constitutional arguments 
against imprisonment for debt and the ways that ability to pay is assessed, 
there are practical arguments for non-imprisonment consequences as well. 
Moving forward, it may benefit parties to consider making a cost-benefit 
argument when advocating on behalf of indigent parties. Research, from 
across the country and in Tennessee, suggests that it is to the benefit of both 
the former offender and the government in the long run to help a person 
reintegrate into society. 
 
 
145. Joshi, supra note 36, at 20–21.  
146. A number of jobs require driver’s licenses for employment applications, so reinstating the 
licenses strengthens the chances of employment and gives people the opportunity to pay off their debt, 
make a living, and contribute to society again. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/17
